Defending Against a Charge of Obscenity in the Internet Age:  How Google Searches Can Illuminate Miller\u27s  Contemporary Community Standards by Creasy, Shannon
Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 3 Spring 2010 Article 6
March 2012
Defending Against a Charge of Obscenity in the
Internet Age: How Google Searches Can
Illuminate Miller's "Contemporary Community
Standards"
Shannon Creasy
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shannon Creasy, Defending Against a Charge of Obscenity in the Internet Age: How Google Searches Can Illuminate Miller's "Contemporary
Community Standards", 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. (2012).
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss3/6
DEFENDING AGAINST A CHARGE OF OBSCENITY
IN THE INTERNET AGE: HOW GOOGLE




Freedom of speech is one of our most fundamental' and treasured
rights, requiring "ceaseless vigilance . . . to prevent ... erosion by
Congress or the States." 2 However, "the right of free speech is not
absolute at all times and under all circumstances." 3 Despite the broad
language of the First Amendment, certain types of speech are not
afforded protection under the Constitution.4 Such unprotected speech
is subject to government regulation that can include bans and
criminal punishment.5 Obscenity is a type of unprotected speech,
having been described by the Supreme Court as expression "utterly
without redeeming social importance." 6
J.D. 2010, Georgia State University College of Law.
1. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,488 (1957) (referring to speech as a "fundamental freedom"
that has "contributed greatly to the development and well-being of our free society"),
2. Id.
3. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
4. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (citing Roth, 354 U.S. 476) (stating that key to the
holding was "the Court's rejection of the claim that obscene materials were protected by the First
Amendment"); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (explaining that certain "narrowly limited classes of
speech" including obscenity, "fighting" words, and libel fall outside the protections of the First
Amendment); JANINE S. HILLER & RONNIE COHEN, INTERNET LAW & POLICY 50-51 (2002).
5. Roth, 354 U.S. at 492-93 (holding that the state criminal obscenity statute is constitutional);
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)) (discussing
categories of unprotected speech and stating that criminal punishment for use of "'epithets or personal
abuse' would not offend the Constitution); HILLER & COHEN, supra note 4, at 50-51; H. Franklin
Robbins, Jr. & Steven G. Mason, The Law of Obscenity - or Absurdity?, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 517,
535-36 (2003) (discussing the potential penalties that accompany criminal obscenity convictions).
6. Miller, 413 U.S. at 20 (citing Roth, 354 U.S. at 476) (stating that key to the holding was "the
Court's rejection of the claim that obscene materials were protected by the First Amendment"); Roth,
354 U.S. at 484 ("We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech of
press."); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; HILLER & COHEN, supra note 4, at 50-51. But see Roth, 354 U.S.
at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 502-11 (1951)) (for
"speech to be punishable [it] must have some relation to action which could be penalized by [the]
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Obscenity law has been controversial since its inception, and over
the years prosecutions of violations have been sporadic.7 Under the
George W. Bush Administration, the federal government stepped up
enforcement of federal obscenity laws.8 "Mounting the biggest attack
on porn since the Reagan Administration," the government secured
forty obscenity convictions during Bush's first term, compared to
four convictions during President Clinton's two terms in office.
9
Revealing an intention to continue the trend of aggressive
enforcement, former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales identified
prosecuting obscenity offenses as fourth on the list of priorities for
the Department of Justice in 2005.10
Widespread Internet access has also brought renewed attention to
the issue of regulating obscene materials." Although older obscenity
cases often targeted literary works and then began focusing on films,
modem criminal prosecutions typically involve images of sexual
conduct,' 2  which are nearly ubiquitous on the Internet.13
government"); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 194 (1979) ("The Court's sin,
Douglas felt, had been to make obscenity an exception to the First Amendment in the first place.").
7. JAN SAMORISKI, ISSUES IN CYBERSPACE, COMMUNICATION, TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND SOCIETY
ON THE INTERNET FRONTIER 267, 269 (Allyn & Bacon eds., 2002) ("Pornographers invariably put
themselves at risk when producing and distributing their products, especially in the face of laws that
leave the definition of pornography open to interpretation and make enforcement subject to the political
winds of change."); Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 299, 324-25
(2008); Bradley J. Shafer & Andrea E. Adams, Jurisprudence of Doubt: Obscenity, Indecency, and
Morality at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 84 MICH. BAR J. 22 (2005), available at
http://www.michbar.org/journal/article.cfln?articlelD=873&volumelID=66. See also Roth, 354 U.S. at
496, 508-13 (dissenting opinions of Justice Harlan, Justice Douglas, and Justice Black reflect
controversy over whether, and to what extent, government can regulate speech).
8. Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Obscenity Prosecutions and the Bush Administration: The
Inside Perspective of the Adult Entertainment Industry & Defense Attorney Louis Sirkin, 14 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 233, 235-37 (2007) (citing Seth Lubove, Obscene Profits, FORBES, Dec. 12, 2005,
at 98).
9. Id.
10. See Shafer & Adams, supra note 7 (discussing Attorney General's stated priorities).
11. Dick Ackerman, Technology & Obscenity: Ever-Changing Legal Challenges, 10 NEXUS: J.
OPINION 37, 37 (2005) ("[Tlhese individuals are upset because pornography is no longer confined to
little shops on the back streets of a city that they can avoid."); Scan Adam Shiff, Comment, The Good,
the Bad and the Ugly: Criminal Liability for Obscene and Indecent Speech on the Internet, 22 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 731, 734-35 (1996) (discussing difficulties that new technologies create for courts
with regard to applying obscenity standards and how recent legislative attention has focused on
obscenity on the Internet).
12. Robbins & Mason, supra note 5, at 542 (discussing the book bumings of ULYSSES as obscenity,
despite it being listed as one of the "greatest novels of the twentieth century"); Doug Linder, Exploring
Constitutional Conflicts, Regulation of Obscenity (2008), http:llwww.law.umkc.edulfaculty/projects/
[VoL 26:31030
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Technological advances that allow pornographers to efficiently
stream online video and view pictures have led to an explosion in the
pornography market. 14 As of 2006, sources tracking pornography
statistics reported that there were approximately 4.2 million
pornographic websites, accounting for 12% of the total sites on the
Intemet. 15 Annual pornography revenue in the United States is
estimated at over $13 billion.16 Additionally, every second, there are
as many as 372 people searching "adult" terms online.' 7 This easy
access to pornography has revived arguments on each side of the
regulation issue, with anti-pornography groups calling for increased
prosecutions to prevent moral decline and addiction,' 8  and free
speech activists insisting that obscenity prosecutions violate the
freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment. 19  Obscenity
jurisprudence remains controversial because "in the hands of a
ftrials/conlaw/obscenity.htm (discussing early prosecutions focusing on classic literary works, such as
ULYSSES and LADY CHAT-rERLEY'S LOVER, and more recent charges aimed at visual images).
13. Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Stopping the Obscenity Madness 50 Years After Roth v.
United States, 9 TEx. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 15 (2007) (discussing how the Internet now makes it
easy to receive and consume sexual imagery in your own home); All-Spy Blog, Internet Pornography
Statistics, www.all-spy.com/blog/2008/07/04/intemet-pomography-statistics/ #time (last visited Mar.
15, 2010) (discussing widespread availability of pornography on the Internet).
14. Shiff, supra note 11, at 735-36 ("[T]he recent proliferation of Internet pornography can be
attributed to [the ability of users to] indulge their fantasies in the privacy of their own home. It can also
be attributed to the ease with which users can download such images."); All-Spy Blog, Internet
Pornography Statistics, http://www.all-spy.com/blog/2008/07/04/internet-pornography-statistics/ (last
visited Oct. 11, 2008).
15. Family Safe Media, http://www.familysafemedia.com/pornographystatistics.html#time. (last
visited on Mar. 15, 2010).
16. Dan Ackman, How Big is Porn?, FORBES.COM, May 25, 2001, http://www.forbes.com/
2001/05/25/0524pom.html (discussing estimates of porn revenues as high as $14 billion annually). But
see Ackman, supra (discussing that cited pornography revenues are exaggerated and estimating Internet
pornography revenues as approximately $1 billion).
17. Family Safe Media, http://www.familysafemedia.com/pomographystatistics.html (last visited
March 23, 2010).
18. Ackerman, supra note 11, at 43 (explaining that easy and quick Internet access to pornography
has motivated increased public outcry for legislators to regulate obscenity); ObscenityCrimes.org,
Morality in Media, http://www.obscenitycrimes.org/WorldOflnternetObscenity.php (last visited Mar.
15, 2010).
19. Free Speech Coalition, http://www.freespeechcoalition.com/index.asp?action=preview (last
visited Sept. 14, 2008). See generally Calvert & Richards, supra note 13 (recounting interviews with
attorneys and prominent adult entertainment industry leaders who have spoken out against obscenity
regulation).
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government willing to use it, obscenity law remains a potentially
potent tool of repression."
20
Despite the controversy, a majority of Supreme Court Justices have
consistently upheld laws that support the regulation of obscene
materials.2 1 The path to a constitutional test for obscenity has not
been an easy one.2 Concerns that regulation of any kind would have
a chilling effect on protected speech led to "a variety of views among
the members of the Court unmatched in any other course of
constitutional adjudication." 23 This division resulted in bitter
disagreement over how to differentiate protected expression from
proscribable obscenity.24 While the Court clearly stated that "sex and
obscenity are not synonymous" and that only "hard core" sexual
conduct specifically defined by state statute is prosecutable,
identifying the line between legal pornography and illegal obscenity
has proven to be extremely difficult.
25
20. Boyce, supra note 7, at 325.
21. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) ("[Ilt does not follow that no regulation of patently
offensive 'hard core' materials is needed or permissible; civilized people do not allow unregulated
access to heroin because it is a derivative of medicinal morphine."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
485 (1957) ("[There is] universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in the
international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the 48 States, and in the 20
obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956.") (internal citations omitted); FREE SPEECH
ON TRIAL: COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVES ON LANDMARK SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 194 (Richard
A. Parker ed., 2003) (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 27) (stating that opinion makes clear that a majority of
Justices believed it possible and necessary to find a way to distinguish between protected and
unprotected speech). But see Roth, 354 U.S. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 502-11 (1951)) ("[For] speech to be punishable [it] must have some relation to
action which could be penalized by [the] government.").
22. Miller, 413 U.S. at 22, 37 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The Court has worked hard to define
obscenity and concededly has failed."); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 79-80 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the difficulties the Court has had agreeing on a definition of
obscenity); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 498 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe
Constitution protects coarse expression as well as refined, and vulgarity no less than elegance.");
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203-404 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Federal
Government should not have as much latitude as the States in regulating offensive material).
23. Miller, 413 U.S. at 22-23, 24 (quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-05
(1968)).
24. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 843 (16th ed. 2007)
("The Warren Court's attempt to define unprotected obscenity in Roth spawned a tortuous period of
divided rulings ... ").
25. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27 (explaining that only "hard-core" pornography can be prosecuted); Roth,
354 U.S. at 487.
[Vol. 26:31032
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1032 2009-2010
 I    [  
  t   ll  
t l f repression. ,,20 
it   ,     
i t tl   i   
t ri ls. 1  t  t   tit ti l    
 22  i   
a illi  ff t  t t     t   
t  rs  t  t t  f 
i l tion."    
i t   tiate t    
i le ity.24  t l     
t    us"   "  
t ifi ll  fi   t t    l , 
i tif ing t  li   l     
  to be extre ely difficult. 25 
. ,  t  ,  . 
. ill r . lif r i ,  . . 5,  73) ]  l ti  f t tl  
offensive 'hard core' aterials is ee e  r er issi le; i ili  l   t ll  l t  
access to r i  s  it is  ri ti   i i l i . );  i  . . , 
485 (1957) ("[ ere is] i ersal j e t t t it  l   ,   
international agree ent f er  ati s, i  t  s it  l  f ll f t   t t ,     
s it  l s t   t      .") l itt );   
ON TRI L: C IC TI  P SP I S     I I   i r  
. arker ed., ) (citi  iller,  . . t ) (st ti  t t i i   l  t t  f 
Justices believed it ssi le  ss r  t  fm    t  i ti i   t   
unprotected s ). t s  t ,  . . t  l , ., )  
tates,  . . , -  ( » ]  t  i l   
ti  i  l   li   t  rn t."). 
. iller,  .s. t ,  ( 3) l , ., i ti   r  r  m  
obscenity and concededly has failed."); aris lt eatre I . l t ,  . . ,  73) 
( rennan, J., isse ti ) ( is ssi  t  iffi lti  t  t   i   i iti  f 
sce it ); i rg . it  t t ,  . . ,  ) t rt, l1  
onstitution r tects rs  r ssi   ll  m ,  l it    ."); 
Jac eIlis . i ,  . . , -{)  ( 4) l , .,  t   
overn ent s l  t a e as  l tit   t  t t  i  r l ti  i  aterial). 
23. iller,  .s. t - ,  ( ti  I t r t t  i it, . . ,  ,  
(1968». 
24. T LEE  . I    , I I L   th ) 
(" he arre  rt's tt t t  fi  r t t  it  i  t  ed f 
i i  li  ..  ). 
25. iller, 413 . . at  (e laining t t l  r -core" r ra hy   ted); t , 
 . .   
4
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss3/6
20101 MILLER'S "CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARDS"
In Miller v. California, after years of wrestling with "the
intractable obscenity problem," 26 the Court set out the three-prong
obscenity test that remains in effect today.27 The Miller test requires
that "an average person" apply "contemporary community standards"
to judge whether material is obscene.28 Despite criticisms that the test
suffers from the same vagueness problems as prior failed efforts,
29
the Court has applied the Miller test for thirty-five years, upholding
the constitutionality of federal and state criminal obscenity statutes. 30
Since the introduction of the Miller test, courts have struggled to
identify and define "community standards." 31 Much debate has
centered on how to determine the true values of a community, with
defendants introducing a wide variety of evidence intended to
establish those elusive standards. 32 Certainly, the Miller Court never
imagined the Internet and the level of complexity it has added to the
process.33 Recently, a Florida man indicted on federal obscenity
26. Miller, 413 U.S. at 16 (quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968)).
27. Id. at 37 (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)) ("[O]bscenity is to be determined
by applying 'contemporary community standards."').
28. Id. at 24.
29. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 85-86 n.9 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(explaining that obscenity is "incapable of definition with sufficient clarity to withstand attack on
vagueness grounds"); Miller, 413 U.S. at 43-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Obscenity-which even we
cannot define with precision-is a hodge-podge. To send men to jail for violating standards they cannot
understand, construe, and apply is a monstrous thing to do in a Nation dedicated to fair trials and due
process."); Robbins & Mason, supra note 5, at 528 (explaining that the Miller test "suffers from the
same frailties as its predecessors").
30. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32-35 (upholding state criminal obscenity statute). But see Boyce, supra note
7, at 319 (discussing Justice Brennan's change of view).
31. Boyce, supra note 7, at 320.
32. State v. Haltom, 653 N.W.2d 232, 239-40 (Neb. 2002) (holding trial court did not abuse
discretion by refusing to allow evidence of comparable materials because such evidence is not, in and of
itself, evidence of community standards); State v. Brouwer, 550 S.E.2d 915, 919, 921 (S.C. Ct. App.
2001) (holding that evidence of comparable materials is generally admissible, but materials offered here
were insufficient as comparable evidence); GEORGE M. WEAVER, HANDBOOK ON THE PROSECUTION OF
OBSCENITY CASES 73 (National Obscenity Law Ctr. ed., 1985).
33. Boyce, supra note 7, at 322 (explaining that a majority of Justices have expressed concerns about
the application of the community standards test to the Internet); Gyong Ho Kim & Anna R. Paddon,
CyberCommunity Versus Geographical Community Standard for Online Pornography: A Technological
Hierarchy in Judging Cyberspace Obscenity, 26 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 65, 80 (1999)
(quoting JONATHAN WALLACE & MARK ANGAN, SEX, LAWS, AND CYBERSPACE 32 (1st ed. 1996))
("In defining community standard in Miller, the Supreme Court 'neither anticipated nor took into
account the rapid advances in computer technology . . . [t]he rapid growth of national and global
computer networks . . . [that] have allowed persons to interact without geographic constraints in a
nonphysical universe called cyberspace."'); Shafer & Adams, supra note 7, at 24.
1033
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charges approached this dilemma in a creative new way. 34 Raymond
McCowen proposed to introduce Google search engine data to
establish the relevant community standards and to show that, by
comparison to the material the residents of his community were
searching for on the Internet, his material was not obscene.
35
McCowen's case settled out of court when he pleaded guilty to one
count of money laundering, leaving open the question whether the
courts would have allowed the data to be used as a window into the
community values.
36
Whether Miller's contemporary community standards test should
be completely abandoned has been the subject of much debate and
falls outside the scope of this work. 37 To date, most governmental
attempts at Internet regulation have been aimed at protecting children
from online pornography, which is another issue that falls outside the
scope of this work.38 This Note will, however, explore the challenges
the courts have encountered when applying the community standards
test, the ways in which both parties have attempted to shed light on
Miller's requirements, and how courts can simplify this process by
allowing Internet search engine data to be introduced as evidence of
the community's values.39 To that end, Part I traces the history of
obscenity law in the United States up to the current Miller test.40 Part
II examines the application of the Miller test, analyzing the
challenges involved in defining the community and the difficulties
defendants face when trying to prove the standard with various types
34. Monica Hesse, Are We What We Google? Attorney Asks What Search Habits Say About Us,
HOUS. CHRON., July 4, 2008, at 14.
35. Id.
36. Tom McLaughlin, Local Porn Producer Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering: Clinton Raymond
McCowen 's Plea Avoids Court Case over Constitutional Issues, NORTHWEST FLA. DAILY NEWS, June
26, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 12004366.
37. Calvert & Richards, supra note 13, at 1 ("[T]his article calls for jettisoning and abandoning
obscenity jurisprudence as we know it .... "); John Tehranian, Sanitizing Cyberspace: Obscenity,
Miller, and the Future of Public Discourse on the Internet, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 3 (2003)
(recommending that Congress and the courts "reconsider the Miller standard and the very notion of
obscenity regulation"). See generally Robbins & Mason, supra note 5, at 517.
38. See generally Tehranian, supra note 37, at 2-7; Jonathan P. Wentz, Ashcroft v. ACLU: The
Context and Economic Implications of Burdened Access to Online Sexual Speech, 17 GEO. MASON U.
Civ. RTS. L.J. 477 (2007).
39. See infra Part I, Part 11, and Part III.
40. See infra Part 1.
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of evidence. 4 1 Finally, Part III argues in favor of more clearly
identifying the relevant community and, under any definition of
community, allowing Google searches (and other search engine data)
to be admitted as evidence to establish the values of that
community.
42
I. THE "TORTURED HISTORY', 43 OF OBSCENITY LAW
A. Roots and Early Efforts at Regulation
Efforts to control sexual expression were relatively rare in the
United States until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.44
Between the Civil War and the 1930s, federal courts largely followed
a fairly precise rule from an early English case, Regina v. Hicklin.
45
The Hicklin test allowed any material that could "deprave and corrupt
those whose minds are open to such immoral influences" to be
banned as obscenity.46 This test had the unintended result of
assessing materials based on the effect they had on the most
susceptible, or sensitive, members of the community.47 Under
Hicklin, books and other materials could be judged obscene based on
the effect an insignificant, isolated passage had on a child.48 As Judge
Learned Hand pointed out, the Hicklin test "would 'reduce our
41. See infra Part II.
42. See infra Part HI.
43. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973); see also SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 24, at
843 ("The Warren Court's attempt to define unprotected obscenity in Roth spawned a tortuous period of
divided rulings ... ").
44. Boyce, supra note 7, at 307 (explaining that obscenity law can be traced back to English
common law, but suggesting that the true motive was to control political or religious expression, since
charges of obscenity were almost always intertwined with sedition, blasphemy or breach of the peace
offenses). See United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 135 (1973)
(inferring early obscenity law was a guise for political agenda since the only early prosecutions involved
politically unpopular defendants).
45. Robbins & Mason, supra note 5, at 523; Eric Yun, Autonomy, Not Aesthetics: "Contemporary
Community Standards" and Speech on the Internet, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 357, 358-59 (2004)
(quoting Queen v. Hicklin, (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 368).
46. Robbins & Mason, supra note 5, at 523 (citing Queen v. Hicklin, (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371);
Yun, supra note 45.
47. Boyce, supra note 7, at 311; Robbins & Mason, supra note 5, at 523-24.
48. Eric Handelman, Comment, Obscenity and the Internet: Does the Current Obscenity Standard
Provide Individuals with the Proper Constitutional Safeguards?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 709, 718 (1995).
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treatment of sex to the standards of a child's library in the supposed
interest of a salacious few.' 4 9 To prevent this bizarre result, the
Hicklin standard fell out of favor and was abandoned with the
Supreme Court's ruling in Roth v. United States.5 °
In Roth, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of obscenity
directly for the first time.51 Having previously categorized obscenity
with "fighting words" and libelous speech, the Court's holding that
federal obscenity statutes did not violate the Constitution was
unsurprising. 52 The Court merely affirmed what had previously been
implied-that obscenity was not entitled to First Amendment
protection. 53 The Roth Court expressly rejected the Hicklin test as
unconstitutionally restrictive, piecing together a new test for
obscenity from various lower court holdings. 54 Designed to address
the constitutional infirmities of the Hicklin test, the Roth test required
that the material in question be viewed as a whole, rather than
allowing portions to be judged individually.55 Additionally, instead of
gearing the test to the most susceptible member of society, the new
test required jurors to apply the perspective of the "average person." 56
The Roth test deemed material obscene when "to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
49. Id. at 718 (citing United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)).
50. WEAVER, supra note 32, at 3 (discussing rejection of the Hicidin test); Robbins & Mason, supra
note 5, at 523-24 (discussing Judge Learned Hand's reaction to the Hicklin test and the change with
Roth).
51. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
52. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (categorizing obscenity with "fighting
words" and libelous speech, Justice Murphy wrote that expressions of this nature are not an "essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and.., that any benefit... derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality").
53. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 92 (1972))
("This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First
Amendment."); Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 ("[Bmplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance."); Calvert & Richards, supra note 13, at 2.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942). 1ut see Boyce, supra note 7, at 317
(quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 512 (Douglas, J., dissenting)) (explaining that application of a test of
community standards "would not be an acceptable one if religion, economics, politics, or philosophy
were involved").
54. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89.
55. Id. (rejecting the Hicklin standard for the test substituted by a lower court); Boyce, supra note 7,
at 316.
56. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488,490; Boyce, supra note 7, at 316.
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the material taken as a whole appeals to [the] prurient interest." 57
Initially seeming to resolve the definitional battles, the Roth test
proved to be just the beginning of the Court's struggle.58 Later
opinions included seemingly minor alterations to the test that
ultimately rendered it unworkable.
59
For years, the Court wrestled with the application of the Roth
standard.6 ° When efforts to apply it continued to fail, the Court
resorted to systematic case-by-case reviews, with the Justices each
applying their own obscenity test.61 This practice resulted in the
review and reversal of many lower court convictions without
additional explanation or opinion, such that "judicial attempts to
follow [the Court's] lead conscientiously. .. often ended in hopeless
confusion. 62
B. Tweaking Roth to Get to Miller-If Only it Were That Simple
Finally, the Court's efforts to gain consensus on a new obscenity
test paid off.63 In Miller v. California, the Court reached majority
57. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89 (explaining that the lower courts had adopted this standard and then
holding that the lower courts had "sufficiently followed the proper standard").
58. See generally Miller, 413 U.S. 15.
59. Miller, 413 U.S. at 22 (discussing, inter alia, the Court's inability to achieve a majority
agreement on the standard for determining what constitutes obscenity); A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (finding error with lower
court holding and announcing new test requiring that material be "found to be utterly without redeeming
social value"); SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 843 ("The Warren Court's attempt to define
unprotected obscenity in Roth spawned a tortuous period of divided rulings ...."); Calvert & Richards,
supra note 13, at 2 (discussing how Roth set the Court on the "tortuous and tumultuous path" of its
obscenity jurisprudence); Shiff, supra note 11, at 739 (explaining how the addition of the "utterly
without redeeming social value" requirement to the test in Memoirs made prosecution virtually
impossible).
60. William D. Deane, COPA and Community Standards on the Internet: Should the People of
Maine and Mississippi Dictate the Obscenity Standard in Las Vegas and New York?, 51 CATH. UNIV. L.
REV. 245, 252 (2001).
61. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23 n.3 (stating that thirty-one cases had been decided using the "Redrup
'policy'). See Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434, 434 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (complaining there
was no justification for allowing the Court to "assum[e] the role of a supreme and unreviewable board of
censorship for the 50 States, subjectively judging each piece of material brought before it.
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 6, at 192-193; Boyce, supra note 7, at 318.
62. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 6, at 244-73 (discussing the year-long work by Justice
Brennan and Justice Burger to formulate a new position); Boyce, supra note 7, at 318 (discussing the
political pressure on the Burger Court and the efforts to gain consensus for a new constitutional
obscenity test).
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support for a new test.64 Fashioning the new Miller standard from the
old Roth test,65 the Miller Court formulated a three-prong conjunctive
test requiring the trier of fact to determine:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.66
If the material in question meets all three of the requirements of the
test, that material is deemed obscene.
67
In the Miller opinion, the Court directly addressed several issues
that made earlier test applications difficult.68  First, the Court
expressly limited the definition of "obscene material" to items that
deal with sex, specifically material depicting or describing "hard
core" pornography. 69 Additionally, the Court emphasized that the
material at issue must be viewed as a whole and could not be
examined piecemeal. 70 Finally, the Court limited state regulation to
only that sexual conduct specifically defined by statute, or
authoritatively construed, as being illegal to depict or describe.
7 1
Despite these efforts, the Miller test has been widely criticized as
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.72 The "contemporary
64. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25.
65. Id.; FREE SPEECH ON TRIAL: COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVES ON LANDMARK SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS 194 (Richard A. Parker ed., 2003) ("The three-pronged test owed much to earlier
opinions.").
66. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25 (internal citations omitted).
67. Id. at 24.
68. See id. at 25-27 (defining and clarifying various issues that caused difficulties in the past).
69. Id. at 27.
70. Id. at 24.
71. Id. at 23-24 ("State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited.").
72. Miller, 413 U.S. at 37-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Handelman, supra note 48, at 731-737
(discussing criticisms of the Miller test and difficulties its application presents). But see Richards &
Calvert, supra note 8, at 262 (interviewing defense attorney Louis Sirkin, who discusses fear that a new
[Vol. 26:31038
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community standards" portion of the test has been particularly
troublesome. 73 Although an obscenity measure relying upon the
"average conscience" and flexible enough to reflect modem views
was not a new concept when Miller was decided,74 the Miller Court's
holding essentially "collapsed the average person and community
standards elements into single concept" to be applied to the first two
prongs of the test.75 As a result, Justice Douglas argued in dissent that
the proposition "that the First Amendment permits punishment for
ideas that are 'offensive' to the particular judge or jury sitting in
judgment is astounding. 76 Addressing such constitutional criticisms
directly, Chief Justice Burger held that the "contemporary
community standards" test is "constitutionally adequate" and serves
the "protective purpose" of insuring that the material "will be judged
by its impact on an average person, rather than a particularly
susceptible or sensitive person-or indeed a totally insensitive
one." 77  Despite the Court's clear finding that the community
standards test provides the necessary constitutional safeguards, the
test is still widely criticized on constitutional grounds.
78
test might be worse given the political climate, explaining that at least Miller worked for him when he
was able to successfully defend a museum's Robert Maplethorpe exhibition under the Miller test).
73. Boyce, supra note 7, at 320; Calvert & Richards, supra note 13, at 15; Deane, supra note 60, at
253; Handelman, supra note 48, at 726-27, 729-31 (discussing the difficulties of applying a community
standard versus a national standard).
74. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25 (citing cases that attempted to settle on an average person's
perspective with flexibility to change with the times); United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119,
121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (Learned Hand, J.) (stressing a need for flexibility in the definition of obscenity by
suggesting that "the word 'obscene' be allowed to indicate the present critical point in the compromise
between candor and shame at which the community may have arrived here and now").
75. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Any effort to
draw a constitutionally acceptable boundary on state power must resort to such indefinite concepts as
'prurient interest,' 'patent offensiveness,' 'serious literary value,' and the like. The meaning of these
concepts necessarily varies with the experience, outlook, and even idiosyncrasies of the person defining
them."); WEAVER, supra note 32, at 10; Handelman, supra note 48, at 736 (discussing the community
standards test and explaining that "[t]he major problem with the Miller standard is that it further opens
an already wide door to subjective judgments of what is obscene"); Shiff, supra note 11, at 740
(explaining that the community standards are applied to the first two prongs of the Miller test).
76. Miller, 413 U.S. at 44.
77. Id. at 33-34 (citing Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1966)).
78. Boyce, supra note 7, at 320; Deane, supra note 60, at 253; Robbins & Mason, supra note 5, at
542 ("Obscenity laws are an ugly form of censorship, and censorship should never be tolerated.").
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II. CHALLENGES OF APPLYING THE MODERN TEST
A. Identifying the Community-The Nation, the State, the City, or the
Cyber-Community?
Although the "contemporary community standards" test has been
governing law for almost four decades, the Supreme Court has
provided little guidance for identifying the relevant community.
79
Court opinions post-Miller provide insight into what the community
definition is not required to include, but give virtually no guidance as
to what is constitutionally required.8 ° Critics debate whether the
courts should apply a national standard, a statewide standard, a
standard based on smaller community units, an "average adult"
standard, or in Internet cases, a cyber-community standard.81 An
inability to define the community is a serious concern because it
prevents the defense from being able to properly exercise its right to
82put forward evidence to prove the community standards.
1. A National Standard Versus a Local Standard
Before Miller, the Supreme Court applied a national standard in
federal obscenity cases. 83 In Jacobellis v. Ohio, the Court stated that a
local definition of the community did not provide sufficient
79. SAMORISKI, supra note 7, at 267 ("Definitions under the Miller standard... can vary from place
to place, judge to judge, jury to jury, and even from time to time."); Shiff, supra note 11, at 742-43.
80. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974) (stating there is no constitutional requirement for
state obscenity juries to apply a statewide standard); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 103-09
(1974) (upholding conviction despite jury instruction to apply a national standard).
81. Robin S. Whitehead, "Carnal Knowledge" is the Key: A Discussion of How Non-Geographic
Miller Standards Apply to the Internet, 10 NEXUS: J. OPINION 49, 53 (2005) ("The constitutional
decision is not a choice between 'local' and 'national.' It is always an average adult community standard
.... .); Shiff, supra note 11, at 743-46.
82. Darlene Sordillo, Casenote and Comment, Emasculating the Defense in Obscenity Cases: The
Exclusion of Expert Testimony and Survey Evidence on Community Standards, 10 LOY. ENT. L.J. 619,
632 (1990).
83. Manual Enter., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) ("We think that the proper test under this
federal statute, reaching as it does to all parts of the United States whose population reflects many
different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, is a national standard of decency."); WEAVER, supra note 32,
at 10 (explaining that although national standard was applied, that approach never garnered majority
support).
JVol. 26:31040
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protection of rights deriving from the U.S. Constitution.84 Rejecting
the application of a local standard, the Court pointed out that it had
previously "explicitly refused to tolerate a result whereby 'the
constitutional limits of free expression in the Nation would vary with
state lines.' 85 Opponents of a national standard, however, argued
that given the size and diversity of the United States, a national
standard would be unascertainable. 86 The requirement of a national
standard was highly controversial and has never enjoyed majority
support from the Court.
87
In Miller, the Court indicated that a local standard was
appropriate. 8 8 Finding no constitutional requirement for application
of a national standard, the Court held that the jury instructions in
Miller calling for jurors to apply a statewide standard did not violate
the Constitution.89 However, a year later, in Hamling v. United
States, the Court stated that the application of a national standard is
not a constitutional violation either.90 Further clarifying what is not
constitutionally required, in Jenkins v. Georgia, the Court held that
juries in state obscenity prosecutions do not have to be instructed to
apply a statewide standard.91 The Court explained that under Miller,
jurors can "rely on the understanding of the community from which
they came as to contemporary community standards." 92 The Jenkins
Court stated that, while "a [s]tate may choose to define ...the
standards in more precise geographic terms," it is not constitutionally
required to do so, and the State can direct "jurors to apply
84. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193 (1964).
85. Shiff, supra note 11, at 743 (quoting Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 194-95).
86. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) ("People in different States vary in their tastes and
attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity."); Jacobellis,
378 U.S. at 200 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) ("I believe that there is no provable 'national standard' ...
."); Deane, supra note 60, at 253 ("One of the principal disagreements between the Justices was whether
a local or national standard should apply to the community standards test."). But see Ashcroft v. ACLU,
535 U.S. 564, 587 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) ("[A]doption of a national standard is
necessary in my view for any reasonable regulation of Internet obscenity."); Manual Enter., 370 U.S. at
488 (setting out national standard for federal obscenity statutes).
87. WEAVER, supra note 32, at 10.
88. Miller, 413 U.S. at 31 (finding no error where jury instructions called for a local standard).
89. Id.
90. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 103-09 (1974).
91. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974).
92. Id.
1041
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'community standards' without specifying what 'community."' 93 The
cases demonstrate that a national standard is neither required nor
unconstitutional if applied. Moreover, states may designate a
statewide standard by statute, but they are not required to do so.
94
2. The Internet-Complicating the Considerations
The emergence of the Internet has further complicated the
identification of the relevant community and has magnified the
potential for harm. 95 In the past, sellers of adult material could choose
which communities were appropriate locations for retail operations or
were safe distribution points.96  In contrast, sellers operating on the
Internet often have limited control over where their products end
up.97 Items posted on the Internet are immediately available for
viewing and downloading by users around the world.98 Since the
Internet defies geographic boundaries, and it is still not possible for
website operators to reliably and effectively limit access based on
geographical location, 99 applying the community standards test could
result in "individuals being prosecuted by the standard of the most
restrictive community with access to the Internet." 100 Despite the
potential for chilling Internet speech, the Supreme Court held in
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, that it does not violate
constitutional requirements for a statute aimed at Internet regulation
93. Id.
94. Id.; Hamling, 418 U.S. at 103-09.
95. Nitke v. New York, 253 F. Supp. 2d 587, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("While the community standards
test was developed at a time when obscenity prosecutions were primarily local... and distributors chose
the localities in which they mailed or displayed their material, online distribution is by definition
nationwide."); Ackerman, supra note 11, at 41-42; Calvert & Richards, supra note 13, at 17 ("The
concept of community in Miller is particularly problematic in the Internet Age, where material can be
downloaded in any community .... ); Tehranian, supra note 37, at 19.
96. Shiff, supra note 11, at 749.
97. Boyce, supra note 7, at 347; Tehranian, supra note 37, at 19.
98. Tehranian, supra note 37, at 19.
99. Boyce, supra note 7, at 347 (citing ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 807 n.13 (E.D. Pa.
2007)); Shiff, supra note 11, at 765 (citing Dennis W. Chiu, Obscenity on the Internet: Local
Community Standards for Obscenity Are Unworkable on the Information Superhighway, 36 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 185, 211-17 (1995)) ("Since the Internet lacks meaningful geographical boundaries, the
'contemporary community standard' is misplaced.").
100. Tehranian, supra note 37, at 18.
[Vol. 26:31042
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to rely on 'contemporary community standards' in determining
whether the materials are obscene.
101
An early Internet case, United States v. Thomas, illustrates a strong
argument for a uniform standard, such as a national or "cyberspace"
standard for Internet cases.102 In Thomas, a husband and wife,
operating an Internet bulletin board in California, were prosecuted
after being caught in a sting operation.103 A United States Postal
Inspector, posing as an online customer, purchased a subscription
from the defendants that provided access to download pornographic
materials in Memphis, Tennessee. 104 The Government prosecuted the
defendants in Tennessee, since that was where the materials were
received, rather than in California, where the materials originated.'0 5
The trial court instructed the jury to apply Memphis community
standards, resulting in convictions on charges of interstate
transmission of obscenity.' 0 6 The defendants in Thomas argued for a
new definition of community for the Internet, such as a "cyber-
community,"' 107 based on "broad-ranging connections among people
in cyberspace rather than the geographic locale of the federal judicial
district of the criminal trial., 108 The court declined to address the
cyber-community issue, however, and focused instead on the fact that
the defendants in this case had access to customer addresses and
101. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 593 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (holding that the use of
"community standards" language by itself does not render the legislation unconstitutional, even though
"[tihe Court of Appeals found that [the statute] in effect subjects every Internet speaker to the standards
of the most puritanical community in the United States," but while "[t]he concern is a real one .... it
alone cannot suffice to invalidate [the statute]"). But see id. at 603 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In the
context of the Intemet, however, community standards become a sword, rather than a shield.").
102. Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 75-80; Shiff, supra note 11, at 745-46.
103. Shiff, supra note 11, at 744-45 (citing United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 704-05 (6th Cit.
1996)); Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 75-80.
104. Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 75-80.
105. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 701, 709 ("[lit is well-established that 'there is no constitutional impediment
to the government's power to prosecute pornography dealers in any district into which the material is
sent."').
106. Id. at 711.
107. Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 79-80 (discussing "virtual communities" that consist of
"netizens" and exist online, with members spread throughout the world but connected by these
communities).
108. Shiff, supra note 11, at 745 (citing Thomas, 74 F.3d at 711).
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could have prevented transmission into Tennessee. 1°9 The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that "juries are properly
instructed to apply the community standards of the geographic area
where the materials are sent.""
l l0
B. Proving the Standard-Should the Material at Issue "Speak for
Itsel"? 111
In obscenity prosecutions, the State is not obligated to provide
proof of the community standards. 1 2 Juries are presumed to already
know the prevailing community standards. 1 3 In Kaplan v. California,
the Supreme Court held that once the State has admitted the materials
at issue into evidence, there is no constitutional requirement that the
prosecution provide expert testimony "or for any other ancillary
evidence of obscenity." 114 The allegedly obscene material "can and
109. Roman A. Kostenko, Are "Contemporary Community Standards" No Longer Contemporary?,
49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 105, 127 (2001).
110. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 711 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. 15, 30-34); Shiff, supra note 11, at 745-46
(explaining how local standards can lead to forum shopping to insure convictions).
I 11. United States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1969) ("Simply stated, hard core pornography...
can and does speak for itself.").
112. Feldschneider v. State, 195 S.E.2d 184, 185 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (finding sufficient evidence to
uphold obscenity conviction even though prosecution did not produce any evidence defining community
standards because "jurors are entitled to use their own common sense") ("They most likely knew what
'contemporary community standards' are as regards the comic book in evidence, both in Clarke County
and in other parts of the State of Georgia, and of the United States."); WEAVER, supra note 32, at 61.
But see United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 168 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that motion for directed
verdict of acquittal should have been granted because jurors had "absolutely no evidentiary basis from
which to 'recognize' any appeal to the prurient interest of the deviate or the typical recipient"); United
States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merch., 565 F. Supp. 7, 8-9 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding movie
Deep Throat and other materials were not patently offensive in civil case tried before judge where State
did not offer evidence of community standards and community survey reports on pornography indicated
widespread acceptance of the material).
113. WEAVER, supra note 32, at 69. But see Illinois v. Nelson, 410 N.E.2d 476, 479 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980) (reversing conviction where survey data was improperly excluded, explaining that "in this case,..
. [where] most of the jurors had lived all their lives in the community of Rockford, did not read a paper
from any other community within the State of Illinois and read few national magazines, it appears that
the jurors would have little practical experience on which to base their opinion of what the state-wide
community standard might be").
114. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973). But see WEAVER, supra note 32, at 62-63
(quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973)) (discussing two rare, but potential
exceptions in cases where the material at issue is not admitted into evidence or cases that involve
extremely unusual material that are considered "directed at such a bizarre deviant group that the
experience of the trier of fact would be plainly inadequate to judge .... ).
1044 [Vol. 26:3
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1044 2009-2010
   I    l.  
 t  i   . 109  
  i s,    
i t t     t  r s     
  t ri ls are sent."IIO 
i g - hould t rial    
Itself,  I II 
 it  ti ,  ted  
    . 11       
 iling t  . I 13  if rnia, 
t  r  t l  t t    t  l  
  , ti al t   
r ti n i  t    
ce enity.,,114 l   l   
.  . t ,  te porary   t porary?, 
. . v \OS 1). 
. ,  .  t  iti  , ,  ,  
( l i i   l l t   l  t     
III. it  t t  . il ,  .  ,      . 
 
. l s i r . t t ,  . .  ,  . . . m i    
l  s it  i ti   t  r ti  i  t      
t r   j      
'contemporary community standards' are as regards the co ic book in e i e ce, t  i    
 i  t  t   t  t t   ,      . 
t s  it  t t  . l ,  .  ,   . )   
er ict f ac ittal s l    r t   j r r   l t l   i   
i  t  'r nize'  l t  t  i t i t t  t  i t      
t t s . ri s rti l    .,  . . ,   
ee  r t  t r t ri ls r  t t tl  ff i  i  i il  t i     
did not offer e i e ce f c it  sta ar s  it  r  r rt     
i s r  t  f t  t i l . 
. , s r  t  , t . t  llli i  . l , \  n  
) (r rsi  i ti  r  r  t   i l  , i i   . 
. [ ere] st f t  j r rs  li  ll t ir li  i  t  it   ,   
fr   t r it  it i  t  t t   lli i     ti l ,  
t  j r rs l   littl  r ti l i      
   
. l  . li i ,  , . ,  -{)  
(quoting aris lt tr  I . l t ,  . . ,  .  ( » i i  t  ,   
e ce ti s i  cases r  t  t ri l t i  i  t itt  i t     
e tre el  s l t ri l t t r  i r  i t  t   :m   
ri  f t  t i   t    t  . "  
16
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss3/6
20101 MILLER'S "CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARDS"
does speak for itself' and is considered to be the best evidence of
whether it is obscene.' 
15
In some civil administrative hearings, where there was no right to
trial by jury, however, a few courts have held that where the State did
not provide any evidence defining the community standards, the issue
could not be decided and the State failed to meet its burden of
proof. 116 For instance, in Golden Dolphin No. Two, Inc. v. State, the
judge held that the prosecution failed to prove that a live show was
obscene since the State did not present any evidence on the
contemporary community standards. 117 To avoid this potential result,
States sometimes do provide evidence of the community standards."
8
Usually, however, the prosecution has no burden to prove this
element for the jury. 119
While the prosecution has little motivation to provide evidence to
define the relevant community standards, such evidence can be
critical to the defendant's case and should be allowed whether the
prosecution submits such evidence or not. 120 The Supreme Court has
held that the "defense should be free to introduce appropriate expert
testimony. 4' 21 In his concurrence in Smith v. California, Justice
Frankfurter stated that '[t]here is a right of one charged with
obscenity ... to enlighten the judgment of the tribunal... regarding
the prevailing literary and moral community standards."'
' 122
115. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 55-56; Wild, 422 F.2d at 36 ("Simply stated, hard core
pornography... can and does speak for itself"). But see Klaw, 350 F.2d at 167 (explaining that jurors
had "impermissibly broad freedom to convict" because they had no more evidence to determine
obscenity than the magazines themselves).
116. Golden Dolphin No. 2, Inc. v. State, 403 So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). But see
City of Miami v. Fla. Literary Distrib. Corp., 486 So. 2d 569, 573 (Fla. 1986) (holding that trial judges
can apply their own knowledge of the community standards where an obscenity case is tried before a
judge and not a jury).
117. Golden Dolphin No. 2, Inc., 403 So. 2d at 1374.
118. WEAVER, supra note 32, at 63-65 (explaining that the Supreme Court generally disfavors expert
testimony in obscenity cases, but sometimes it is wise to utilize it to offset defendant's expert witnesses).
119. Id. at64.
120. Illinois v. Nelson, 410 N.E.2d 476, 479 (111. App. Ct. 1980) (finding reversible error where trial
court refused to admit defendant's evidence because while "[t]he State does not have the burden of
introducing any evidence as to what the state-wide community standard is... that cannot justify a court
in denying the defendant the right to introduce the best evidence he can gather on this issue.").
121. WEAVER, supra note 32, at 63 (quoting Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973)).
122. Rebecca Dawn Kaplan, Cyber-Smut: Regulating Obscenity on the Internet, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 189, 192 (1998).
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Defendants have attempted to introduce many types of evidence to
establish the "contemporary community standards."' 123 Although
courts sometimes allow such evidence, trial judges wield wide
discretion in this area.' 24 And, even though exclusion of this type of
evidence can cripple the defense, the Supreme Court has upheld
convictions where evidence was excluded, ruling that any resulting
error was harmless. 
2 5
1. Introducing the Experts-Explaining the Standard
One type of evidence that can be helpful to both the prosecution
and the defense in obscenity cases is expert witness testimony.
126
Trial courts only allow expert testimony if the witness qualifies as an
expert in the field and the information the witness provides is either
something the layperson would not know, or it is at least "helpful" to
the jurors in understanding the standard. 127 While there is not a
particular field that produces an "obscenity expert," a wide variety of
individuals representing many fields have qualified as experts to
provide insight into community standards, such as psychiatrists,
psychologists, sociologists, ministers, and even police officers. 128
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, the Supreme Court registered
disapproval of the use of expert testimony in obscenity cases, stating
that "[t]his is a not a subject that lends itself to the traditional use of
expert testimony.' 129 However, in Miller, issued on the same day as
123. See WEAVER, supra note 32, at 61-77 (explaining different types of defense evidence commonly
used such as comparable materials, public opinion surveys, experts, etc.).
124. Id. at 63 (explaining that the defense can "introduce both expert and non-expert evidence on
community standards"); Boyce, supra note 7, at 350.
125. Boyce, supra note 7, at 350 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-10 (1974)).
126. Showcase Cinemas, Inc. v. State, 274 S.E.2d 578, 580 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (upholding
conviction on state obscenity charges in case where prosecution introduced expert witness testimony on
community standards); WEAVER, supra note 32, at 63-65.
127. Sordillo, supra note 82, at 634-35.
128. Belleville v. Family Video Movie Club, Inc., 744 N.E.2d 322, 325 (111. App. Ct. 2001) (allowing
certified sex therapist with a Ph.D. in sex research to testify as expert witness for the defense); Showcase
Cinemas, 274 S.E.2d at 580 (finding sufficient evidence presented as to community standards where
clinical psychologist testified as expert witness for the State, and expert witness in "psychology, social
theory and design and a graduate of numerous theological institutions and a teacher of sexology and
sexual dysfunctioning [sic]" testified for one of the defendants); WEAVER, supra note 32, at 66; Sordillo,
supra note 82, at 634-35.
129. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973).
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Paris Adult Theatre I, the Court found no constitutional violation
where the State's expert witness was a police officer who had
conducted a statewide survey on community standards. 130 Most
modem courts allow expert evidence to prove the community
standards as long as the testimony is "relevant and not misleading to
the jury.' 13 1 In Illinois v. Nelson, the court held that expert witness
testimony was properly excluded since it was not helpful because the
data was "clear and self-explanatory so that the jurors should have no
difficulty interpreting the results without expert aid."'
' 32
2. Surveys and Opinion Polls-Asking the Community
Surveys and opinion polls provide another source of insight into
the standards of the community. 133 While potentially useful to both
parties, survey evidence is usually offered by the defense. 134 For the
prosecution, commissioning a poll is a strategic decision that must be
carefully considered. 135 Given that the State is not required to present
evidence of the community standards, the prosecution runs the risk
that the results could indicate community acceptance of the
material. 136 In such a case, the survey could then become exculpatory
evidence benefiting the defense. 13 7  However, proponents of
prosecutorial use of survey evidence have advised that a carefully
crafted and conducted survey could be used for years across multiple
130. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 n.12 (1973) (holding no constitutional error where the
expert witness was a police officer who had many years of experience dealing with obscenity cases, had
testified in other prosecutions, and had conducted an extensive survey).
131. Sordillo, supra note 82, at 637-638.
132. Illinois v. Nelson, 410 N.E.2d 476,479 (111. App. Ct. 1980).
133. WEAVER, supra note 32, at 71-72 (discussing need for prosecutors to more frequently use survey
evidence); Sordillo, supra note 82, at 640-641.
134. WEAVER, supra note 32, at 72. See Sordillo, supra note 82, at 645 (explaining that survey
evidence can backfire for the prosecution if it reveals acceptance of the materials in the community, but
the defense faces no such risk).
135. Sordillo, supra note 82, at 645.
136. FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 135 (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1976);
Sordillo, supra note 82, at 645.
137. SCHAUER, supra note 136 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)); Sordillo, supra note
82, at 645.
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trials, offering some protection in cases where courts require the State
to provide evidence of the standard. 1
38
Regardless of which party offers a survey, it must meet certain
requirements to be admissible as evidence.' 39 When determining
whether to admit survey evidence, courts closely examine how
precisely the poll touches on the specific issues involved. 140 Since a
visual image may be patently offensive but a verbal description of
that image may not have the same impact, courts have held that
survey evidence is inadmissible where questions are too general and
do not properly describe the material at issue. 14 1 For example, in
United States v. Pryba, the court held that poll data was properly
excluded because it was "not probative on whether the charged
materials enjoy community acceptance" since the interviewees were
not questioned "regarding the materials at issue or similar materials,
but rather ... [were asked about] their opinions on the viewing of
'nudity and sex,' defined broadly.' ' 142  The court stated that
"[c]ommunity acceptance is the touchstone of admissibility,"
explaining that data that does not actually show acceptance in the
community is irrelevant. 1
43
Survey questions must also be carefully crafted to ensure
relevancy. 144 Also, if the sample size and selection are not based on
reliable scientific methods, the evidence will be vulnerable to attack
on reliability and validity grounds. 145 In Illinois v. Nelson, the
appellate court held that exclusion of survey data compiled by an
138. WEAVER, supra note 32, at 72.
139. Id. at 71.
140. Sordillo, supra note 82, at 623.
141. State v. Midwest Pride IV, Inc., 721 N.E.2d 458, 467 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting survey as
evidence of community standards because "not a single question in the survey describes the material
alleged to be obscene or addresses any of the specific acts shown in the videotapes"); State v. Tee &
Bee, Inc., 600 N.W.2d 230, 233 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Kenosha v. C & S Mgmt., 588 N.W.2d 236
(Wis. 1999)) (excluding survey results because "survey respondents were not 'sufficiently apprised of
the nature of the charged materials,' and, therefore, the survey results were irrelevant"); Sordillo, supra
note 82, at 642-43 (citing United States v. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. 1225, 1227 n.3, 1229 (E.D. Va. 1988)).
142. United States v. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. 1225, 1229 (E.D. Va. 1988).
143. Id. at 1230.
144. Sordillo, supra note 82, at 642 (citing Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1225) (holding survey was
irrelevant because pollster's "questions were not designed to elicit information about whether there was
community acceptance of the actual materials in question or similar materials").
145. WEAVER, supra note 32, at 72.
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expert in survey research was reversible error. 146 There, the court
found that the survey questions were relevant in evaluating the
community standards, explaining that "survey evidence may be the
only way to prove degrees of acceptability." 147 Similarly, in Belleville
v. Family Video Movie Club, Inc., the court held that the trial court
erred by excluding survey evidence that was gathered by a law clerk
through extensive travel to stores statewide and reviews of similar
movies offered throughout the state.
14 8
In contrast, in Pryba, the court found that the survey data in that
case, which was based on a "new approach to the study of
community," was "unreliable, unfairly prejudicial, and confusing and
misleading to the jury., 149 Finding a similar lack of scientific
standards, in People v. Thomas, the court upheld the exclusion of
survey evidence where the methods used could not be reviewed
because the number of people polled and the manner used to select
participants was not disclosed. 50 While surveys must be constructed
with care, courts have held that "properly conducted opinion surveys
may be useful in gauging community standards for the purposes of
determining whether the materials at issue are obscene."'
151
3. Comparable Materials-What Else Is Out There ... and, Is It
Selling?
Defendants often try to show that comparable materials are readily
available in an attempt to establish that such items are accepted in the
community, but courts have consistently held that merely presenting
examples of materials available for sale in the community is not
146. Illinois v. Nelson, 410 N.E.2d 476,479 (I. App. Ct. 1980).
147. Id. at 479.
148. Belleville v. Family Video Movie Club, 744 N.E.2d 322, 331-32 (I11. App. Ct. 2001).
149. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1232 & n.12 (explaining that the methods used by the sociologist in the
"ethnographical" study did not meet the rigorous standards required to be admissible as evidence and
were "simply not science").
150. Belleville, 744 N.E.2d at 331 (citing People v. Thomas, 346 N.E.2d 190, 194 (II. App. Ct.
1976)).
151. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1229 (citing United States v. Various Articles of Merch., 750 F.2d 596,
599 (7th Cir. 1984)).
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sufficient. 152 A majority of courts apply a test developed in Womack
v. United States to determine admissibility of comparable
materials. 153 The Womack test requires that the defendant show: (1)
the materials are actually "similar" to the material at issue in the trial,
and (2) the comparison materials enjoy a "reasonable degree of
community acceptance."'
154
In State v. Brouwer, the appellate court held that comparable
materials offered by the defendant were properly excluded, even
though similar to the materials at issue, explaining that "[w]hile we
agree such evidence could be admissible in an obscenity prosecution,
here [the defendant] tendered no proof the items offered enjoyed a
reasonable degree of acceptance in the local community, such as
expert testimony or cable, intemet or satellite television provider
subscription and sales records."' 155 Finding a similar lack of proof of
community acceptance, the court in State v. Haltom found no abuse
of discretion where the trial court excluded video tapes that were
available in stores and a hotel nearby.' 56 The court held that the
materials "demonstrate only that other videos are available in the
community" but did not prove acceptance. 1
57
Distribution figures for comparable materials have been held to be
insufficient as evidence of acceptance, but courts have indicated that
sales figures for comparable materials show demand and may be
admissible to show acceptance. 158 Arguably, the fact that an industry
generates billions of dollars in revenue reflects a certain level of
152. United States v. Kilbride, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1070 (D. Ariz. 2007) (stating that mere
availability of comparable materials is not evidence of community standards); State v. Brouwer, 550
S.E.2d 915, 920-921 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that mere existence of comparable materials in
community is insufficient as evidence of values); SCHAUER, supra note 136, at 134.
153. Brouwer, 550 S.E.2d at 919 (citing Womack v. United States, 294 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir.
1964)).
154. Id. (citing Womack, 294 F.2d at 206) ("Although decisions from other jurisdictions are not
entirely uniform, the vast majority of state and federal courts have concluded such evidence is
admissible subject to the predicate test for admissibility found in Womack v. United States.") (citation
omitted).
155. ldat921.
156. State v. Haltom, 653 N.W.2d 232, 239 (Neb. 2002).
157. Id. at 239.
158. Brouwer, 550 S.E.2d at 921 (citing Flynt v. State, 264 S.E.2d 669, 676 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)).
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acceptance within the community. 159 However, in State v. Brouwer,
the court rejected a compilation of thirty photocopied cash register
receipts showing purchases and rentals of sexually-oriented products,
explaining that "such 'self-selected' evidence falls far short of the
requisite showing to establish community acceptance."
160
III. MEETING THE CHALLENGES -MAKING MILLER WORK IN THE
INTERNET AGE
A. Which Community?-When in Cyberspace, Do as the
"Netizens "161 Do?
The legal standards that govern society must change to keep up
with technology. 162 While many critics have called for an end to the
use of the "contemporary community standards" test in obscenity
cases, it is highly unlikely that Miller will be overturned any time
soon.163 As recently as 2002, in Ashcroft v. ACLU, a plurality of
Justices on the Supreme Court agreed that Miller's "contemporary
community standards" test is applicable to the Internet. 164 Therefore,
there is a pressing need to make the test function more fairly in the
Internet Age. 165 In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court described the
Internet as a "unique and wholly new medium of worldwide
communication." 166 Certainly, the Internet differs from other forms of
159. Calvert & Richards, supra note 13, at 9 (quoting defense attorney Paul Cambria) ("It's obvious
that [pornography] is acceptable to a large number of people because they're spending literally billions
of dollars on adult material. There is no greater barometer of acceptance than people taking their money
and allocating it toward something like that.").
160. Brouwer, 550 S.E.2d at 921 n.7.
161. Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 79 (discussing "virtual communities" that consist of"netizens"
and exist online, with members spread throughout the world but connected by these communities).
162. Handelman, supra note 48, at 737.
163. Robbins & Mason, supra note 5, at 531 ("When one attempts to apply the vague Miller standards
to a real-life situation, the absurdity becomes glaring."). See Calvert & Richards, supra note 13, at 38;
Yun, supra note 45, at 358.
164. Yun, supra note 45, at 371. But see Nitke v. New York, 253 F. Supp. 2d 587, 604 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (citing Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 586 (2002)) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that
previous obscenity jurisprudence aimed at other forms of media should not bar an as-applied challenge
to Internet obscenity statutes based on the community standards test).
165. See Kostenko, supra note 109, at 126-28 (discussing whether it still makes sense to apply a
geographic standard given society's technological advances).
166. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).
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media and presents its own unique opportunities and challenges. 167
One such challenge involves identifying the relevant community in
the context of applying obscenity laws. 168 Obscenity convictions can
result in prison sentences and steep fines. 169 An inability to define the
community is unacceptable because it prevents the defendant from
effectively exercising the right to present evidence to prove the
community standard. 
170
Since the Internet defies geographical boundaries, the
"contemporary community standards" test must take on a different
meaning when applied to the Internet. 17 1 To fulfill the goals of
obscenity law, communities are supposed to be able "to protect
themselves from exposure to objectionable materials." 172 Therefore,
in Internet cases, the relevant community is really the cyber-
community, since that is where the materials at issue are actually
located. 173  Cyber-communities have been defined as "virtual
communities" comprised of "netizens" who "congregate and visit
virtual neighborhoods that are spread all over the world."
174
Obscenity on the Internet is invisible to those who do not travel on
the Internet. 175 Therefore, it is only appropriate that courts apply the
167. Nitke, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 604 (explaining that Internet obscenity statutes have a greater potential
to suppress protected speech than those obscenity statutes aimed at other forms of media); Ackerman,
supra note 11, at 37-38.
168. Ackerman, supra note 11, at 41-43; Tehranian, supra note 37, at 19.
169. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 479 nn.1-2, 492-93 (1957) (holding that the state criminal
obscenity statute is constitutional); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (citing
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)) (discussing categories of unprotected speech and
stating that criminal punishment for use of "epithets or personal abuse" would not offend the
Constitution); Robbins & Mason, supra note 5, at 535 (discussing the potential penalties that accompany
criminal obscenity convictions).
170. Sordillo, supra note 82, at 632 ("But when the community remains undefined, evidentiary
problems may arise. How can the defense determine the extent and scope of evidence to put forward on
community standards when he or she does not know what 'community' the jury has in mind?").
171. Nitke v. New York, 253 F. Supp. 2d 587, 603-05 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Ashcroft v. ACLU,
535 U.S. 564, 586 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring)); Boyce, supra note 7, at 347 (citing ACLU v.
Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 807 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 2007)); Shiff, supra note I1, at 765.
172. Shiff, supra note 11, at 750.
173. Kaplan, supra note 122, at 193 (discussing the application of a cyber-community standard to the
Internet); Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 87.
174. Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 79.
175. Kaplan, supra note 122, at 193-97 (discussing the application of a cyber-community standard to
the Internet). But see United States v. Extreme Assoc., Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 159-60 (3d Cir. 2005)
(declining to make special exceptions under existing obscenity jurisprudence merely because case
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standards of the cyber-community. 176 Using a "connection-based
definition of community rather than a location-based one" enables
online communities to determine their own standards just like a
geographical community. 177  A uniform standard is needed for
Internet cases to prevent prosecutorial forum shopping, self-
censorship, and impermissible restrictions on protected speech. 1
78
Despite strong arguments favoring a cyber-community standard,
courts have indicated an unwillingness to apply such a standard,
holding instead that juries are to judge the materials based on the
standards of the community where the material is received. 179 It
appears that a local, geographic definition of community will likely
continue to be applied to determine whether materials posted on the
Internet are obscene. 180 Fortunately, technological advances can
provide new tools to help make even local application of the test
function more effectively in the Internet environment.'81
1
involves Internet transmissions since there are many other similarities to cases involving other forms of
distribution and three of the charges involve items ordered online but sent through the mail).
176. Kaplan, supra note 122, at 193.
177. Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 87.
178. Calvert & Richards, supra note 13, at 17 (citing United States v. Extreme Assoc., Inc. 431 F.3d
150 (3d Cir. 2005)) (explaining prosecutorial forum shopping as in this case where the defendants were
charged where the material was downloaded rather than where the material originated); Kim & Paddon,
supra note 33, at 77-79 (explaining that the nature of the Internet could lead to an "impermissible chill
on protected speech because ... operators cannot select who gets the materials they make available on
their bulletin boards"); Jeffrey E. Faucette, The Freedom of Speech at Risk in Cyberspace: Obscenity
Doctrine and a Frightened University's Censorship of Sex on the Internet, 44 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1168
(1995) (discussing how the application of community standards can lead to prosecutorial forum
shopping and how the Thomas case may have led to Carnegie Mellon University's "hasty ban" of certain
Internet newsgroups).
179. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Bagnell, 679
F.2d 826, 830 (11 th Cir. 1982)) ("[T]here is no constitutional impediment to the government's power to
prosecute pornography dealers in any district into which the material is sent."); United States v. Little,
No. 8:07-CR-170-T-24MSS, 2008 WL 151875, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2008) (rejecting argument that
a worldwide standard must be applied in Internet cases and applying the standards of the community
where the materials were downloaded); Calvert & Richards, supra note 13, at 17 (discussing forum
shopping in United States v. Extreme Assoc., Inc., 431 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 2005)); Kaplan, supra note
122, at 193-94 (explaining the need for a cyber-community standard).
180. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709; Little, 2008 WL 151875, at *3 (rejecting worldwide standard for
Internet cases).
181. Matt Richtel, What's Obscene? Defendant Says Google Data Offers a Gauge, N.Y. TIMES, June
24, 2008, at Al (introducing Google Trends data, "[defendant's attorney] is trying to show both
accessibility and interest in the material within the jurisdiction of the First Circuit Court for Santa Rosa
County, where the trial is taking place").
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B. "Searching "for the Standard-Proving the Community Values
with Search Engine Data
Regarding evidentiary issues, there are two actions that can be
taken to make Miller more workable. First, the State should be
required to present evidence to prove the community standards.
182
Some courts have attempted to take this approach, but have been
reversed, and under current law, the prosecution is under no
obligation to present evidence to prove the community standards.'
83
However, since the jury must determine whether the materials at
issue violate community standards, those standards are an element of
the offense, and the prosecution should be obligated to prove that
element. 184  Even if the court does not provide much-needed
clarification on determining the relevant community, forcing the
State to prove this element will, in and of itself, trigger an
identification of the community. The State will have to identify the
community to prove the standard, so that would effectively switch the
burden from the defendant to the prosecution, where the burden
rightfully belongs. 1
85
Second, the courts should allow either party to use new search
engine tracking technology to illuminate the standards of the
community. Regardless of how the court defines the community, new
Internet technology can shed light on the true values of the
community. 186 Two such technologies have been created to mine data
182. United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 168 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that motion for directed verdict
of acquittal should have been granted because jurors had "absolutely no evidentiary basis from which to
.recognize' any appeal to the prurient interest").
183. Miami v. Fla. Literary Distrib. Corp., 486 So. 2d 569, 570, 573 (Fla. 1986); Feldschneider v.
State, 195 S.E.2d 184, 185 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (finding sufficient evidence to uphold obscenity
conviction even though prosecution did not produce any evidence defining community standards
because "jurors are entitled to use their common sense.... [t]hey most likely knew what 'contemporary
community standards' are as regards the comic book in evidence, both in Clarke County and in other
parts of the State of Georgia, and of the United States"); WEAVER, supra note 32, at 61-63.
184. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 204-205 (1977) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970) ("The Due Process Clause 'protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."').
185. Id.
186. Miguel Helfi, Google's New Tool Is Meant for Marketers, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at C4
("The collection of search queries that people type into Google has been called a 'database of intentions'
since it is a window into what people are interested in and, sometimes, what they are interested in
buying.").
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from Google's powerful and popular search engine.' 87 The tools,
Google Trends and Google Insights, allow a view into the public's
online searching habits by "graphically display[ing] the most popular
search terms" and allowing "user[s] [to] compare multiple terms'
popularity over time." 188 Raymond McCowen proposed to introduce
Google Trends data at his criminal obscenity trial, but since that time,
Google has released a new tool. 189 Google Insights is a powerful new
extension of Google Trends, offering even greater ability to analyze
the data by allowing users to "slice the data into finer geographic
areas than with Trends . . 190 Since both tools can evaluate
information in the aggregate for cities, states, or nations, the
information can be assessed for virtually any community the court
chooses.191
From an evidentiary perspective, those tools can easily meet the
requirements for admissibility in obscenity cases. First, since the
technology is new, information technology professionals can be
brought in as expert witnesses to explain how the tools work, which
will meet the requirements of either explaining something a
layperson would not normally understand without assistance, or if the
jury is particularly computer-savvy, the testimony would most
certainly be helpful until the technology is in wide-spread usage and
is no longer "new."'1 92 Also, the data from the tools can be analogized
to surveys or opinion polls, but with fewer relevancy issues. Where
survey questions must be carefully crafted to ensure the actual issues
are reflected in the questions, 193 the Google queries are "crafted" by
the searchers themselves, and have "been called a 'database of
intentions' since [it provides] a window into what people are
interested in."'
194
187. Michelle Conlin, The Best of 2006: Ideas: The Concepts That Are Reshaping the Business
World-And All of OurLives, BUS. WK.., Dec. 18, 2006, at 96; HeIft, supra note 186; Hesse, supra note
34.
188. Helft, supra note 186; Hesse, supra note 34.
189. HeIft, supra note 186.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Sordillo, supra note 82, at 634-35.
193. WEAVER, supra note 32, at 71; Sordillo, supra note 82, at 640-641.
194. Helft, supra note 186.
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While some may argue that interpretation of the searchers'
intentions presents a problem, Google Insights provides clarification
by differentiating between terms so that "[u]sers can slice the data by
categories to distinguish, for example, searches for Apple the
company and apple the fruit."' 95 According to Google Trends,
Pompano Beach, Florida ranked in the top five cities whose residents
routinely search "salacious" topics 196 and "people are at least as
interested in group sex and orgies as they are in apple pie.
'' 97
Arguably, the mere fact that a term is searched reflects, at a
minimum, interest in the subject. And, since a certain number of
searches are required before the data will register, a reasonable
sample size is assured.
198
Additionally, search engine data illuminates the standard by
providing access in an objective way, allowing the necessary insight
without concerns about a lack of candor that can sometimes pose a
problem on surveys. 199 Especially in cases involving sensitive topics
such as pornography and sex, sometimes there will be "jurors sitting
on a jury panel who will condemn material that they routinely
consume in private." 200 These tools provide that insight without self-
reporting of the interviewees and the lack of candor that can
accompany polls and surveys.
20 1
In the Internet equivalent of an evidentiary offering of comparable
materials, a defense attorney in a federal obscenity trial brought in a
computer and ran standard Google searches to show the jury the
broad array of pornographic material that is available on the
195. Id.
196. Michael Mooney, Google Trends Reveals South Florida 's Penchant for Salacious Searches,
MIAMI NEWS TIMES, July 17, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 13651625.
197. Richtel, supra note 181 (quoting Raymond McGowen's defense attorney).
198. Steve Adams, Popularity Contest: New Google Tool Allows Businesses to Gauge Interest by
City, PATRIOT LEDGER, Aug. 5, 2006, at 36 ("Now Google Trends enables visitors to enter any search
term that generates a significant amount of traffic and receive a list of the ten cities or regions where the
term is queried most frequently.").
199. Richtel, supra note 181 (quoting defense attorney) ("[W]e can show how people really think and
feel and act in their own homes .....
200. Id.
201. Id. (defense attorney commenting on how jurors sometimes condemn material during a trial that
they consume in the privacy of their own homes).
[Vol. 26:31056
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Internet. 202 He then ran searches for well-known sports figures to
show, that by comparison, there are far more pornographic sites than
sites discussing other popular interests.20 3 While the court allowed the
demonstration, the searches did not sway the jury, as convictions
were returned on all counts. 204 Those searches, however, merely
showed that similar materials were available on the Internet, without
reflecting acceptance of those materials.
This is not the case with the Google Trends and Google Insights
data. Originally created to help marketers track interest in their
products and websites, these tools actually reflect access and interest,
since Internet users actively engage the search engine and seek out
the information reflected.20 5 The information provided by these new
technological tools is analogous to sales figures, rather than
distribution figures, in that it reflects affirmative action that has been
taken on the part of searcher seeking the material, as opposed to
merely showing what material is available. 20 6 Unlike standard
searches, the data from Google Trends or Google Insights can satisfy
the Womack test for admissibility.20 7 The proponent of the evidence
can ensure that the searches are for "similar" materials to those at
issue by actually viewing samples of the sites pulled down by
particular search terms.20 8 Acceptance is shown since searchers
actively sought the material, rather than it merely being available
with no way to gauge whether anyone accepted it or was even
interested in it.20
9
Recognition of the value of Google search engine data is not




205. Helft, supra note 186.
206. Helft, supra note 186.
207. See generally State v. Brouwer, 550 S.E.2d 915, 918-21 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining the
Womack test).
208. Id. at 920 (explaining that to satisfy the first prong of the Womack test, "the materials being
compared [must be] in fact 'similar'....").
209. Id. (explaining that "[m]ere availability of similar material by itself' is not sufficient to establish
acceptance in the community).
210. Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 678 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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subpoenaed Google for search engine data to show the effectiveness
of parental filters.211 The federal government sought a significant
number of search queries entered by Google users and Google
objected, fighting to protect the privacy of its customers.212 Google
has now created its own tools to allow the public to benefit from
mining of its data without compromising the privacy of its users.213
CONCLUSION
Under current law, whether material is obscene is determined by
applying the three-prong Miller test, which requires the trier of fact to
apply contemporary community standards to two of the three prongs
of the conjunctive test.2 14 While there are compelling arguments
against using the Miller test in Internet cases, 215 the courts seem to be
favoring its application. 216 In light of this, three actions can be taken
to make the Miller test operate more fairly and effectively in the
Internet Age.
First, it is crucial that the relevant community be easily identifiable
so the defense can exercise its right to present relevant evidence. 217
For Internet cases, the community should be a cyber-community
rather than a geographic community, since the materials at issue are
actually located in cyberspace.218 If the relevant community is a
cyber-community, then the allegedly obscene materials will be
judged based on the community standards of the Internet.2 19 Despite
211. Id. at 678-79.
212. Id. at 679.
213. See generally Helft, supra note 186; Richtel, supra note 181.
214. See discussion supra Part I.
215. See discussion supra Part 11; Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 80 (quoting JONATHAN WALLACE
& MARK MANGAN, SEX, LAWS, AND CYBERSPACE 32 (1st ed. 1996)) ("In defining community standard
in Miller, the Supreme Court 'neither anticipated nor took into account the rapid advances in computer
technology... [t]he rapid growth of national and global computer networks ... [that] have allowed
persons to interact without geographic constraints in a nonphysical universe called cyberspace."').
216. See discussion supra Part I1; United States v. Extreme Assoc., Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 160 (3d Cir.
2005) (declining to make special exceptions under existing obscenity jurisprudence merely because case
involves Internet transmissions); Shiff, supra note 11, at 744-45 (citing United States v. Thomas, 74
F.3d 701, 704-05 (6th Cir. 1996)).
217. Sordillo, supra note 82, at 632.
218. See discussion supra Part 111; Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 81.
219. Kim & Paddon, supra note 33, at 81.
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strong arguments for such a standard, early cases reveal a reluctance
to apply an Internet-based standard, as courts have chosen instead to
apply the standards of the community where the material is sent or
received.22 °
Second, regardless of how the court defines the community, the
State should be required to prove the community standards.22' Under
current law, the State can choose to submit the materials at issue as
the only proof of whether those materials are obscene. 222 Obscenity
charges are serious criminal offenses with convictions resulting in
prison sentences and steep fines.223 Requiring the State to prove all
the elements of a charge before taking away someone's liberty is a
fundamental principle of our law under the Due Process Clause.224 If
the State alleges that the material violates a particular standard, then
the State should have to prove exactly what that standard is.
And finally, new technologies should be utilized to help illuminate
the community standards.225  Currently, Google has two tools
available that can shed light on the values and standards of almost
any community by showing which terms the residents of the
community are most commonly searching.226 If the Miller test is
going to continue to be applied, the court must be open to allowing
new technology to provide valuable insight so that the test can
function more effectively and fairly in the Internet Age.
220. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709 (quoting United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 830 (11th Cir. 1982))
("[T]here is no constitutional impediment to the government's power to prosecute pornography dealers
in any district into which the material is sent."); United States v. Little, No. 8:07-CR-170-T-24MSS,
2008 WL 151875, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2008) (rejecting argument that a worldwide standard must
be applied in Internet cases and applying the standards of the community where the materials were
downloaded).
221. See discussion supra Part 1II; United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 168 (2d Cir. 1965).
222. United States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1969) ("Simply stated, hard core pornography...
can and does speak for itself."); SCHAUER, supra note 136, at 132.
223. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492-93 (1957) (holding that the state criminal obscenity
statute is constitutional); Robbins & Mason, supra note 5, at 535 (discussing the potential penalties that
accompany criminal obscenity convictions).
224. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 204 (1977).
225. See discussion supra Part III.
226. See Richtel, supra note 181.
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